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Abstract
We investigate the efficacy of three social distancing controls on the spread of
SARS-CoV-2 using an agent based SIR model on a small world network structure: 1)
Global social distancing with a fixed probability of adherence. 2) Individually initiated
social isolation when a threshold number of contacts are infected. 3) Use of personal
protective equipment (PPE) to reduce viral shedding and resultant infectivity. The
primary driver of total number of infections is the viral shedding rate, with probability
of social distancing being the next critical factor. These results suggest that higher
compliance with PPE usage and personal hygiene has the potential to decrease the
number of infections and shorten epidemic duration. Individually initiated social
isolation was effective when initiated in response to a single infected contact. The
combination of social isolation and PPE resulted in very low levels of infection. Our
model suggests that widespread application of social distancing through government
control can drastically reduce viral spread; even in the absence of widely adopted
social distancing protocols, high use of PPE can also dramatically reduce the viral
spread while short-duration quarantine following exposure to an infected individual
was less effective.
Introduction
The SARS-CoV-2 virus that has spread throughout the globe has created societal
disruption and had a massive impact on global health [1]. With no known treatment,
public policy and human behavior are currently the only tools that are available to
mitigate the spread [2]. Different countries, and different states within the US, have
implemented different approaches to social distancing [2, 3]. While most government
plans include some social distancing, questions have arisen as to the efficacy of social
distancing, how long social distancing should last and to what extent it is needed [4].
Moreover, citizens who have been told to shelter in place have grown frustrated and
want confirmation that social distancing is having the desired effect [5–7].
In addition to control imposed by governments to reduce human contact, there
have also been social changes that have taken place that may work in concert to
mitigate the spread of the virus [8, 9]. Individuals who live with an infected individual
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are being asked or required to quarantine for 14 days prior to interacting in the larger
society [10]. Removing individuals who have known exposure to the virus from social
contacts will affect the viral spread. One question is whether these individual
responses of behavioral modification will be enough to moderate the spread and
whether there are additive or non-additive effects when implemented with top-down
government policy on social distancing [8].
One key parameter of the viral spread is the contact rate between infected and
non-infected individuals [3]. As the number of contacts increases, the probability of
getting the virus increases [11,12]. While modeling contacts can be done in mean-field,
statistical, and metapopulation SIR models [1, 13–16], agent-based models provide a
way to directly investigate how the connectedness of the social network influences viral
spread [17, 18]
In this paper, we examine three types of social distancing and control measures
that can influence the viral spread in a social network. The first type is social
distancing imposed on the social network at a global scale, where the likelihood of
social distancing is applied uniformly to all agents in the network. This form of social
distancing serves as a proxy for government policies such as shutting down businesses
and issuing shelter in place orders [19]. The second type of social distancing occurs
when agents have social connections that are infected and symptomatic [2, 20]. In this
case, agents isolate from their neighbors in the network if they are surrounded by
enough symptomatic neighbors. This type of behavior is frequently recommended by
government authorities, though enforcement is sometimes limited and so requires that
agents choose the appropriate action [19]. The third type of control measure involves
the reduction of the rate of viral spread, for example through personal protective
equipment (PPE) such as wearing a mask in public to reduce viral
transmission [20, 21]. We examine how each of these measures alone and in concert
with each other influence the viral outbreak.
We ask the following three questions:
1. When social distancing is top-down and imposed globally, is there a phase
transition, i.e. a sharp phase transition where the total number of infected
individuals varies dramatically, with varying levels of compliance? If such a
phase transition exists, then government policy may seek to maximize the
efficacy of their social distancing policy while mitigating the costs.
2. How does behaviorally imposed social distancing both through self-isolation and
the use of PPE interact with globally imposed social distancing? Are the effects
additive or non-additive? If the effects of the different types of social distancing
are synergistic then imposing all three social distancing measures may reduce the
epidemic to levels that neither policy nor behavioral change could achieve alone.
3. Finally, how does the reduction of infectivity as through the mitigation of viral
shedding using PPE, influence epidemic spread under different social distancing
and control scenarios?
We examine these questions by developing an agent-based model implemented on a
Watts-Strogatz small world network that reasonably approximate real-world social
networks [22–24].
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Model and Parameters
Watts-Strogatz networks
We implement an agent-based model on Watts-Strogatz (WS) networks. The WS
networks can simultaneously demonstrate both high clustering and short average path
length, and thus serve as effective approximations of social networks that are neither
completely random nor regular [22]. High clustering and short average path length
allow for local interactions and more distant interactions to be incorporated [23–25],
which are properties often found in real-world networks.
The WS small world network in our model is characterized by three parameters:
number of nodes N , average node degree K and rewiring probability. The rewiring
parameter is used to determine the likelihood of rewiring each edge starting from a
regular ring lattice. A rewiring parameter of 0 preserves the original ring lattice; a
rewiring parameter of 1 simulates a random network. We fix the number of nodes
N = 500 and the average degree K = 20, which allows ln(N)≪ K ≪ N . We then
vary the rewiring probability among the values {0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50}. For each of our
four rewiring probabilities we construct 10 networks on which to run simulations.
Agent-Based Model
We develop an SIR, network-based, agent-based model where agents pass through
various infection states (Fig. 1). Similarly to SARS-CoV-2, agents pass through an
initial asymptomatic infection state followed by either a main asymptomatic infected
period or a symptomatic infected period [3].
In our model, each agent carries an individual pathogen level that varies over time.
Initially, this level is set to 0 pathogen units for susceptible agents. At each time step
(conceived as a day) a susceptible agent increases their pathogen level by a fixed
fraction of the pathogen levels of their infected neighbors. Model runs are initiated
with a small number of infected agents, whose pathogen levels are initially set at 35
pathogen units, and the remainder of the agents are initially deemed susceptible. In
our model, there is a global pathogen-level infection threshold that applies to all
agents. We fixed that threshold to 25 pathogen units. If the pathogen level for an
agent exceeds this threshold, then the agent become infected. These initial and
threshold levels for the pathogen in the model are not based on real-world data, but
rather were selected for simplicity to illustrate the mechanism of viral shedding.
Following the onset of infection, agents pass through an initial asymptomatic
infection state, followed by a main infection state (either symptomatic or
asymptomatic), before becoming resistant/removed (Fig. 1). The length of the initial
asymptomatic state is the same for all agents, and can be set to last one or more days.
Once the initial asymptomatic state passes, the agent enters one of two main states:
infected and asymptomatic or infected and symptomatic. The lengths of the two main
states are set independently from each other, but are the same for all agents.
Following the main infection state, the agent is either resistant or removed.
In addition to the infection state parameters, each agent is in one of two behavior
states: socially distanced or not socially distanced. The behavior state is reset each
day. If an agent is not socially distanced on a given day, then that agent can interact
with any neighboring agent. If an agent is socially distanced, the agent does not
interact with any neighboring agents. Agents socially distance in a given day for one
of two reasons. A global social distance probability is set, which determines the chance
that an agent will socially distance on a given day. A local social distance threshold is
set, and this value dictates individual responses to infected symptomatic neighbors. If
the number of infected symptomatic neighbors of an agent equals or exceeds this
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threshold, the agent will social distance independently of the global parameter.
Fig 1. Agent Infection States. Flow chart of infection pathways in the agent
based model.
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Model Parameters and Simulations
We ran two sets of simulations over different parameter spaces. Our primary
simulation ran through ten networks for each set of parameters given in Table 1.
Based on the results of this primary simulation, we ran a secondary set of simulations
over a more refined parameter space given in Table 2 to analyze the phase transition
behavior observed in the primary simulations. The parameters for the secondary
simulation were selected based on our analysis of the primary data using regression
trees to identify critical variables and on the observed ranges where phase transitions
were observed.
Our simulations are designed to determine the efficacy and interactions between
several key parameters concerned with social interactions and control measures: 1)
top-down imposed social distancing, 2) behaviorally-adjusted social distancing and 3)
lowered viral shedding through increased PPE use and personal hygiene. We
conceptualize our model parameters in the following way:
1. Social distance probability: the probability that an agent is socially distancing
on any given day. This is conceived as representing government-imposed social
distancing policies.
2. Social distance threshold: the number of infected symptomatic neighbors needed
to cause an agent to social distance for that day. This is conceived as
representing individual response to the presence of a symptomatic infected social
connection.
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Table 1. Primary Simulation Parameters
Parameter Description Value
Infection
Initial asymptomatic pe-
riod
incubation period after ex-
posure
1, 3, 5
Pathogen infection thresh-
old
amount of virus to become
infected
25
Main asymptomatic infec-
tion period
period of infection without
symptoms
5, 8, 10
Main symptomatic infec-
tion period
period of infection with
symptoms
5, 8, 10
Chance symptomatic the probability an agent
becomes symptomatic
0.25, 0.50, 0.75
Network
Number of nodes (N) number of agents 500
Average node degree (K) the average number of con-
tact for agents
20
Rewiring probability probability each edge is
rewired
0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50
Initial outbreak size number of infected agents
at the start of the run
5
Social Distance and
Controls
Social distance probability the probability (out of
100) that an agent socially
distances on a given day
(reported as a percentage)
0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70,
80, 90
Social distance threshold number of infected neigh-
bors needed for an agent
to social distance
1, 2, 4, 8
Viral shedding the amount of pathogen
level that the infected
agents shed
1%, 5%, 25%
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Table 2. Secondary Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Infection
Initial asymptomatic period 3
Pathogen infection threshold 25
Main asymptomatic infection period 8
Main symptomatic infection period 8
Chance symptomatic 0.25, 0.50, 0.75
Network
Number of nodes (N) 500
Average node degree (K) 20
Rewiring probability 0.10
Initial outbreak size 5
Social Distance and Controls
Social distance probability (as percent-
age)
60, 61, 62,. . . , 78, 79, 80
Social distance threshold 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Viral shedding 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%
3. Viral shedding: the fraction of viral load that an infected agent passes to each of
its neighbors. This is conceived as representing general adherence to control
measures such as mask-wearing and physical distancing.
Results
Regression Tree
We used a regression tree to partition the variation in final number of infected nodes
across model parameters and runs in our primary simulation [29]. Reductions in viral
shedding were associated with the primary partition in the regression tree in Fig. 2.
Viral shedding rates below 15 relative to an unmitigated value of 25 were associated
with a mean number of infections of 46 of 500 agents. Reduced viral shedding rates
with social distancing over 25% led to overall infection of approximately 2% of the
population. If the overall viral shedding is reduced dramatically to 1/5 of the
unmitigated rate, even without additional social distancing, less than 1% of the
population becomes infected.
Achieving low levels of infections in populations without reducing viral shedding
requires significantly higher levels of top-down imposed social distancing (over 75%)
which results in an approximately 1% infection rate in the population. If below 75% of
the agents are social distancing, the infection rates for the populations are much
higher; these range from a low of 21% (if individuals self-isolate in response to one
infected social contact) all the way up to 97% with poor adherence to social distancing.
Thus, with a higher level of viral shedding, it becomes important to have agents
self-isolate when a social contact becomes symptomatic. Even if this occurs, the
infection rate in the population is an order of magnitude higher (10% vs. 1%) then if
the viral shedding was reduced. Failure to achieve this strict social distancing in
response to an infected social contact results in a wide-spread outbreak
(approximately 62% of the population infected).
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Fig 2. Regression Tree for Total Number of Infections. This regression tree
identifies the input features with strongest influence on total number of infections.
Each box contains the percentage of observations and associated mean number of
infected agents.
viral.shedding < 15
social.distance.probability >= 25
viral.shedding < 3
social.distance.threshold < 2
social.distance.probability >= 65
social.distance.probability >= 75
social.distance.threshold < 3
social.distance.threshold < 2
initial.asymptomatic.period < 2
140
100%
46
67%
12
47%
127
20%
5
10%
249
10%
59
2%
312
8%
327
33%
82
10%
6.9
7%
233
3%
107
2%
359
2%
432
23%
269
6%
129
2%
339
4%
487
18%
yes no
15 May 2020 7/16
Phase transitions
Based on the primary drivers of total number of infections found in the regression tree
analysis, we conducted secondary simulations on a refined parameter space. In these
simulations, we observed strong phase transitions in the total number of infections as
a function of the social distancing and viral shed parameters. These transitions are
shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 4, and Fig. 5. In all figures, the maximum number of infections is
500 (the number of nodes in the model).
In Fig. 3, a phase transition exists between viral shedding of 5% and 10%, across
all levels of social distance thresholds and social distance probabilities. In Fig. 4, a
clear phase transition exists at a social distance threshold of 1, across all levels of
social distance thresholds and social distance probabilities. If the social distance
threshold parameter is 2 or more, then it is possible to have epidemics that infect the
entire population. In Fig. 5, a phase transition exists around a social distance
probability of 73-74%, across the levels of social distance threshold and viral shedding.
If the social distance probability is 74% or more, then our simulations end with a
small number of infected agents.
Fig 3. Viral Shedding.
Viral shedding vs. final infection of agents for different levels of social distance
thresholds (1 through 5) and for social distance probabilities varying from 60%
to 80% at 1% intervals. A clear phase transition exists at viral shedding of 5-
10% across the levels of social distance thresholds and social distance probabilities.
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Given the regression tree analysis of our primary simulations, it is clear that viral
shedding and social distance probability play key roles. In our secondary simulations
over a refined parameter space, this becomes more clear. In Fig. 6, it is apparent that
the primary driver of total number of infections is the viral shedding rate, with social
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Fig 4. Social Distance Threshold. Social distance threshold vs. final infection of
agents for different levels of viral shedding (5% to 20%) and for social distance
probabilities varying from 60% to 80% at 1% intervals. A clear phase transition exists
at a social distance threshold of 1, across all levels of social distance thresholds and
social distance probabilities.
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distance probability being the next critical factor. Specifically, simulations with large
total infections cluster to the upper left of the plot, where viral shedding rates are
higher and social distancing is enacted by approximately 60% of agents.
There is also a clear interaction between the social distance probability and viral
shedding parameters and the resulting number of infected agents and the length of the
epidemic. These interactions are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. In Fig. 7, there is
clustering of long epidemics when the chance is near 60% and the viral shedding rate
is high. As the social distance probability increases to 80% and the viral shedding rate
decreases, there is a phase transition where simulations result in outbreaks of short
duration. In Fig. 8, most infections result in either a limited outbreak (less than 25%
of population) or the vast majority of the population infected. As the social distance
probability is increased from 60% to 80%, the length of the epidemics increase while
remaining limited in total number of infections before jumping to high number of
infections and then returning to short epidemic lengths.
Discussion
Mathematical modeling can provide tools to better understand epidemic dynamics and
can vary from purely theoretical to more data driven and predictive [26]. While a
simple model such as this one should not be used to make large-scale policy
recommendations, it can provide a framework for specific hypothesis testing. Also, our
model may be applicable to social networks of smaller size exhibiting small world
characteristics, such as seen in college settings [32]. Here we use the model to ask
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Fig 5. Social Distance Probability. Social distance probability vs. final infection
of agents for different levels of viral shedding (5% to 20%) and for social distance
threshold varying from 1 to 5. A phase transition exists around a social distance
probability of 73-74%, across the levels of social distance threshold and viral shedding.
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several specific questions about how different behaviors might impact population
infection rates. We specifically examine three main actions that can be taken to curb
the SARS-CoV-2 spread: 1) government imposed social distancing; 2) behaviorally
induced social isolation following virus exposure and 3) infection rate reduction, e.g.
through behavioral adaptation through PPE or increased hand-washing and
disinfecting.
Early in the pandemic, government imposed social distancing was the primary tool
used to slow infection rates or as commonly described “flatten the curve” [1]. Actions
taken are quite varied and there is generally no uniform agreement about how much
social distancing is necessary to significantly slow SARS-CoV-2 transmission. To
examine the full potential for social distancing we examine a wide range of possible
scenarios varying from no official social distancing to extreme social distancing (90%).
While the two extreme scenarios are easy to envision (zero social distancing is business
as usual and 90% is all but non-essential businesses closed), more moderate social
distancing scenarios are harder to translate into direct societal actions. Nevertheless,
we find a clear phase transition with social distancing in our small-world models. In
general, social distancing compliance below 65% results in a wide-spread outbreak,
while social distancing compliance above 75% contains the virus to low levels. For our
secondary simulations over a refined parameter space, in the absence of stringent
individual social distancing responses we observe that there is a phase transition that
occurs as the percentage of agents socially distancing changes from 73% to 74%.
While it is difficult to relate these transitions to specific policies that may be put in
place, it is apparent that aggressive social distancing policies are required to contain
an outbreak. Moreover, social distancing measures that allow for more inter-agent
contact will likely allow rampant viral spread.
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Fig 6. Total infections across social distance probability and viral shedding.
Social distance probability vs. viral shedding, with social distance threshold and total
number of infections indicated by color and size. Larger numbers of infections occur
with low social distance probability and high viral shedding rates.
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In addition to government actions, individual behavior taken during the pandemic
can greatly affect the dynamics of the pandemic. Most governments have issued
guidelines for social isolation if in contact with a diseased individual. The most
commonly recommended guideline is 14 days of self-isolation to avoid exposing other
individuals [6, 8, 10]. However, despite these official guidelines, self-isolation following
exposure requires that infected individuals inform their contacts and that exposed
individuals voluntary comply. Given these caveats, we wanted to understand how
self-isolation following an infected symptomatic social contact would influence final
disease progression. In this model, self-imposed social distancing occurs only on the
days when the agent has sufficiently many symptomatic contacts in the network.
Thus, our model incorporates self-imposed social distancing as highly responsive to an
agent’s short-term perceptions regarding infection risks within their community.
Interestingly, for self-isolation to negatively impact the number of infections, an
extreme level of responsiveness was needed by the agents involved. In our model, it
was necessary for self-isolation to occur following exposure to only one infected agent.
If self-isolation occurred following the symptomatic infection of two or more contacts,
the effect on viral spread was minimal. Given the high number of asymptomatic
infected people with SARS-CoV-2 [15, 27], it is likely that many individuals who have
come in contact with an infected individual are not aware of their exposure. Our
findings also highlight the well-known fact that contact tracing following an
individual’s positive test is critical for limiting the spread of the infection [4].
Individuals responsiveness to recommended government actions are highly
variable [6]. One control measure to decrease the virus spread is wearing a mask in
public [21]. While this behavior is widely adopted in Asian countries that had
experience with prior epidemics, it was much slower to catch on in Western
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Fig 7. Social Distance Probability and Viral Shedding. Social distance
probability vs. viral shedding, with social distance threshold and length of epidemic
indicated by color and size. Longer outbreaks occur with low social distance
probability and high viral shedding rates.
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countries [21, 28]. Mask wearing can significantly reduce viral shedding since
individuals wearing a mask have a reduced chance of passing the virus on to others.
Yet this policy remains controversial and adoption of mask wearing has been highly
variable [30, 31]. Mask wearing in our model is captured by viral shedding. In our
model, if the viral shedding rate is very small, then the epidemic does not spread,
With moderate rate of viral shedding, the social distance threshold at which someone
decides to self-isolate after coming into contact with an infected individual becomes
much more important. In our model, if the social distance threshold is set to 1 (agents
self-isolate after coming into contact with at least one infected agent), then the final
total infection rate in the population is approximately 12%. However, if the
behaviorally induced social distancing does not take place or takes place at a higher
threshold, then the final infection is much larger with the overall infection rate in the
population approximately 62%. Finally, when the viral shedding in our model was set
at a high level of 25% (simulating a comparatively more infectious disease), the
government imposed social distancing was required to be greater than 80% to control
the outbreak, resulting in an approximately 1% infection rate in the population. Other
less stringent social distancing conditions result in a viral infection rate between 25%
and 97.5%.
Conclusion
Although not prescriptive, the analysis of our simple agent-based model on synthetic
networks provides strong evidence for generalizations. Social distancing controls in
this model exhibit a sharp phase transition regarding total number of infections, either
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Fig 8. Total Infections and Length of Epidemic Length of epidemic vs. total
number infected with social distance probability, social distance threshold , and viral
shedding indicated by color, size, and symbol. Data from secondary simulations.
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when imposed at a large scale by government mandates or when based on individual
response to infected contacts. Our models suggest that in order to be effective,
mandatory social distancing such as stay-at-home orders need to be broadly applied
across all segments of society with a high degree of adherence by individuals.
Alternatively, self-isolation must be immediately enacted if a social contact is known
to be infected. Finally, if it is possible to reduce viral shedding through adherence to
mask wearing, then the size of the final infected population can be significantly
reduced.
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